
3 July 1951

3.5(c)

Copy No. CI - 9

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



Office of Current Intelligence

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C02740735

## SUMMARY

|     |               |  | GENERAL           |             |              | 3   | .3(h)(1) |
|-----|---------------|--|-------------------|-------------|--------------|-----|----------|
|     |               |  |                   |             |              |     |          |
| * . |               |  | USSR              | • I         |              |     |          |
|     |               |  |                   |             |              | (   | 3.3(h)(1 |
|     |               |  | FAR EAST          |             |              | (   | 3.3(h)(1 |
|     |               |  |                   |             |              |     |          |
|     |               |  | NEAR EAST         |             |              |     |          |
| 5.  | Iran has stre | ngthened its   | military forces i | n oil field | area (page ( | 3). |          |
|     |               | EA   | STERN EUROPI      | <u>.</u>    |              |     |          |
| 8.  | Czechostovak  | .1a (page 7).  | no alarming Yug   |             |              |     |          |
|     |               | Annual Control of the |                   |             |              |     |          |
|     |               | i in the   |                   |             |              |     |          |
|     |               |  | * * * *           |             |              |     |          |
|     |               |  |                   |             |              |     |          |
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| 3. | 3 | (ł | ۱) | (1 | ) |  |
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| <br>USSR                                  | 3.3(h)(1) |
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C02740735 3.5(c)3.3(h)(2) FAR EAST 3.3(h)(2)

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3.3(h)(2)

5. Iran has strengthened its military forces in oil field area:

The US Military Attache in Tehran reports that, as of 1 July, the total Iranian ground force at Abadan is estimated to be 2, 500. Its equipment consists of small arms, mortars,

machine guns and 11 tanks mounting 75mm guns. Naval strength is placed at 500 men with several small vessels, whose largest guns are four inch. The bulk of the Tenth Iranian Division is located at Ahwaz, some 80 miles away from Abadan (three hours distant in time).

The Military Attache believes the troops now in Abadan are completely adequate to preserve order. The Iranians are apparently not awed by the British cruiser with its six inch guns off Abadan and would resist any British efforts to land military forces. Personnel from the British cruiser have already been denied landing permission. There is no doubt, according to the Military Attache, that any British effort to land would result in Iranian military action that would cease only when sufficient British forces were brought in to defeat Iranian units.

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3.5(c)

| of Iranian deployment and  | I Iranian determination  | atest US military<br>to resist is full   | estimate<br>v gorroboráted  |
|--|--|--|---|
| by all available reports,  |  | Iran's mov   | ves to  |
| strengthen its military for aimed at preventing intern   | rces in Abadan and els<br>nal disorders.   | sewhere are, how   | vever, also   |
|  |  |  |   |
|  | EASTERN EUROPE   |  | 3.3(h)(2)   |
| 6. Role of Czech Army seen a   | as defensive:  |  |   |
| Army is at present better as He also expresses the opinion to reorganize and re-equip intends to keep Czechoslova an effort in Czechoslovakia, lites, to improve the size ararmies, the Bulgarian and Rideologically and technically | on that Soviet failure to the Czechoslovak arm; kia as a supply base for the comment: Previous as well as in the other and quality of the armed Rumanian seem to be reported to carry out Soviet against the control of the carry out Soviet against the | bsence of strong dern equipment a rage soldier, the than an offensive to make a determ y indicates that the the present. The present or the present of the forces. Of the elatively better preserved designs | leadership, and the low Czechoslovak mission. ined effort he USSR  ndicated an Satel- Satellite |
| 7. Yugoslav Government reque<br>Czechoslovakia:  | ests stoppage of strate  | gic metal shipme   | ent to  |
|  | The Yugoslav Gove<br>US-British authorit<br>stop a 150 ton railre  | ies in Trieste an  | d Austria   |
|  | - 7 -  |  |   |
|  |  |  | 2.2/5//2/   |
|  |  |  | 3.3(h)(2)   |
|  |  |  | 3.3(N)(Z)   |
|  | , A  |  | 3.3(n)(2)   |

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|    |  | from Trie<br>which it ha<br>Political A<br>eld in the British Zo   | ste by a Wester<br>ad been sold.<br>Adviser in Trie   | to Czechoslovakia<br>rn European firm to<br>According to the US<br>ste, the ferro-chrome<br>ending a decision on  | e <sub>.</sub> |
|    | its final disposition  | •  |   | 3.3(h)(2)   | ١              |
|    | points to the continu<br>ferrous metals by k   | ogressively decrease<br>ned purchase through<br>oth Czechoslovakia<br>s trade is being carr  | d since 1948,<br>intermediarie<br>and Hungary.  | s of Yugoslav non-<br>No firm evidence  | <b>,</b>       |
|    |  |  | X.  | 3.3(h)(2)   | )              |
| 8. | Western officials of   | oserve no alarming N   | ugoslav activit   | y regarding Albania:  |                |
|    | tion that might invit<br>to the Yugoslav Gov<br>ered advisable, it s<br>all foreign adventur<br>would arouse Yugos | his Britis his opinion instigating ment is keenly awar e Soviet intervention ernment on its Albar hould be drafted as a es in Albania. Aller | h and French continuous that Yugoslav any pro-Tito note of the danger. Allen advised an political action general statem expresses the discourage Alba | Belgrade reports that olleagues concur with ia is not currently moves in Albania and of provoking a situation if a demarche ctivity is still considment that the US oppose opinion that nothing anian resistance more inted by some other | ses            |
|    | refugees in Yugosla<br>of these reports by<br>veal any Yugoslav-s<br>It is improbable tha                          | Yugoslav efforts to via for subversive acthe US Embassy in Esponsored militant act the Tito governmentight result in the over                | organize and setivity in Alban elgrade has the tivity among the twould sponso   | ia. Investigation us far failed to re- ne Albanian refugees.  |                |
|    |  | - 8 -  |   |   |                |
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